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DECONSTRUCTING LINGLE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKINGS DOCTRINE
DALE

A. WHITMAN*

In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,' Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote one of her last and potentially most important
opinions in the field of land use regulation.! Speaking for a
unanimous court, she put to rest the notion, originating in Agins v.
City of Tiburon,3 that a due process violation - a regulation that
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests" - could
be regarded as a Fifth Amendment taking.
In rallying the Court to this position, O'Connor performed an
important service, although one that will probably be condemned
by property rights advocates." She seems to have put an end to a
James E. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Steven J. Eagle of George
Mason University School of Law for his helpful comments on a draft of this
article. Any errors, however, are attributable to the author alone.
1. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). The decision was announced on May 23, 2005.
2. O'Connor announced her retirement on July 1, 2005. Perhaps her more
famous "parting shot" in the land use regulation field was her dissent in Kelo
v. City of New London, decided one month later, on June 23, 2005, holding
that a city's use of the eminent domain power for economic development
objectives was legitimate under the Fifth Amendment's "public use" clause.
545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). While her opinion in Kelo
was more controversial and garnered far more public attention, it did not unlike Lingle - represent the views of the court at large.
O'Connor had previously written the majority or plurality opinion in
four other takings cases: Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(finding no taking in Hawaii's scheme allowing residents living on groundleased land to buy out the reversions); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718
(1987) (finding a taking in a statute that prevented small fractional interests
in allotted Indian lands from passing to the owner's heirs or devisees); Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (finding no taking in a rent control
ordinance applicable to mobile home parks); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998) (finding a taking in a federal statute that retroactively imposed an
obligation on mining companies to pay lifetime health benefits of miners who
had worked for them). For a complete review of O'Connor's takings opinions,
see ROBERT MELTZ, PROPERTY RIGHTS "TAKINGS": JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S
RESEARCH SERVICE (2005), available at
OPINIONS, CONGRESSIONAL

www.ncseonline.org/ NLE/CRSreports/05aug/RS22227.pdf
3. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Property Rights and Wrongs, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE, June 29, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler
200506290806.asp.
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long series of cases in which the Court confused and conflated due
process clause violations and takings. She eliminated any
possibility of future reliance by landowners on the "due process
taking" notion of Agins, thus removing a significant litigation risk
for local and state governments. She accomplished this with
considerable intellectual vigor, clarity, and force.
However, it is not clear whether Justice O'Connor or her
judicial colleagues recognized the full import of their work. In this
essay I propose to discuss at least two implications of the Lingle
reasoning that the opinion itself does not mention. The first is that
if Lingle is taken seriously, it appears to destroy the "character of
the governmental action" prong of the Penn Central takings test.
That is a result that may make takings easier for landowners to
establish.
The second implication arises from Justice O'Connor's
denigration in Lingle of "legitimate public purpose" as a factor in
takings cases. If her rhetoric on this matter is taken at face value,
it might be thought to lead to the conclusion that the government's
purposes and objectives in enacting a regulation are always
irrelevant to a takings analysis. I propose to show that this is far
from true, and that governmental purposes and objectives remain
highly relevant in assessing whether a taking is justified by the
"background principles" concept of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.5 Indeed, the true residual meaning of "character
of the government action" is the government's use of a regulation
to enforce Lucas "background principles." Of course, the existence
of "background principles" makes takings more difficult for
landowners to establish.
I.

THE STATE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW

Strangely, for a case with such important implications for
land use, Lingle did not involve a land use regulation at all.
Rather, Chevron brought a challenge to a Hawaii statute limiting
rent that oil companies
could charge
dealers leasing
company-owned service stations, thus helping independent lesseedealers remain in business. While the ostensible objective of the
legislation was to restrain the high fuel prices that Hawaii
residents were paying, Chevron argued that it would be entirely
ineffective in doing so.' Hence, by Chevron's view, the statute did
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. Economists for Chevron testified that the rent cap would allow existing
lessee-dealers, when transferring occupancy rights to new lessees, to charge
incoming lessee a premium reflecting the value of the rent reduction. Lingle,
544 U.S. at 535-36. Hence, they argued that in the long run, neither lesseedealers as a group nor their customers would be benefited by the cap. Id. Of
course, the State's experts disagreed. Id.
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not "substantially advance legitimate state interests" and
consequently was a taking under Agins. The lower federal courts
agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
"substantially advances" test was inappropriate for determining
the existence of a taking 7 and that there was no taking on the facts
of Lingle under any other relevant test."
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lingle provides a convenient,
concise summary of current takings law. She identifies four
theories, each based in an earlier Supreme Court decision, on
which a finding of a taking can be based. First, "where government
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her
property" - however minor - it must provide just compensation.9
A second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely
deprive an owner of "all economically beneficial use" of her
property." The Court held in Lucas that the government must pay
just compensation for such "total regulatory takings," except to the
extent that "background principles of nuisance and property law"
independently restrict the owner's intended use of the property."
Outside these two relatively narrow categories, regulatory takings
challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn
Central. The Court in Penn Central acknowledged that it had
hitherto been "unable to develop any 'set formula"' for evaluating
regulatory takings claims, but identified "several factors that have
particular significance." 2 Primary among those factors are "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations." 3 In addition, the
"character of the governmental action" - for instance whether it
amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property
interests through "some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good" - may be
relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred. 4 The Penn
Central factors - though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary
questions - have served as the principal guidelines for resolving
regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical
7. See Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due
ProcessFrom Takings Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2006).
8. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536, 548.
9. Id. at 538; see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982)(holding that a state law requiring landlords to permit cable
companies to install cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a taking).
10. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (emphasis in original); see Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1019.
11. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-32.
12. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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takings or Lucas rules. 5
A fourth category of taking theory, not mentioned in the
quotation above, is applicable only in the context of an "exaction"
- a demand for land or money made by government in return for
a permit, rezoning, or other land use approval 6sought by a7
landowner. Justice O'Connor referred to the Nollan" and Dolan1
cases, which explicate when a taking will be held to occur under
these circumstances, but they are not germane to my present
analysis, and I therefore set them aside.
How well has the Court done its job in this area? If one rates
the three non-exaction theories in terms of clarity and
predictability, the record is decidedly mixed. The "permanent
physical invasion" test of Loretto would get, without doubt, the
highest grade - say, an A-. Physical occupations by, or at the
behest of, the government are usually easy to identify. Moreover,
the magnitude of the invasion is relevant only in calculating the
landowner's damages, and not in determining whether a taking
has occurred. The test can therefore usually be applied in a
straightforward manner.
The Lucas test, which established that a taking occurs when
no economic value remains in the property, is not quite as easy to
apply, mainly because of the exception for "background principles"
such as nuisance law, which allows regulation without payment of
compensation of activities that would have been regarded as
nuisances or the like at common law. The scope of the "background
principles" concept is not particularly clear and continues to be
debated; it is discussed in detail below. 8 Hence, I would suggest
that, in terms of clarity and predictability, Lucas rates perhaps a
B- or a C+ grade.
The third test, Penn Central, is by comparison a disaster in
terms of clarity and predictability. 9 None of the test's three
"prongs" can be calculated by landowners or government officials
with any certainty. First, the "economic impact" of the regulation
on the landowner is said to be relevant, but no one knows, and no
one can learn from reading the Court's opinions, how great an
15. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.

16. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). In substance, Nollan and
Dolan hold that an exaction is a taking unless the land or money demanded by
the government will be used to solve a problem or meet a public burden that
will be created by the landowner's development, and even then, only if the
magnitude of the exaction is roughly proportional to the cost or burden that
will be imposed on the public by the development.
18. See infra notes 46-60.
19. See Bradley C. Davis, Substantially Advancing Penn Central:
Sharpening the Remaining Arrow in the Property Advocate's Quiver for the
New Age of Regulatory Takings, 30 NOVA L. REV. 445 (2006).
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impact is necessary to constitute a taking. The answer is
presumably less than a 100% reduction of value, or else Penn
Central and Lucas would be redundant of one another, as the
Court plainly believes they are not. But beyond that, the required
impact is simply uncertain. 0
The second prong of the Penn Central test is almost equally
opaque. What are "distinct investment-backed expectations" and
how can a regulation interfere with them? The only significant
guidance we have from the Court is Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,1 in
which the Court recognized that a Penn Central taking might have
occurred despite the fact that when the landowner acquired title to
the property, the regulation in question was already in place,
although it was not when his predecessor, a corporation that he
controlled, bought the land. While the majority held that a
landowner would not be absolutely barred from a takings claim by
virtue of having notice of the regulation when she or he acquired
the land, the role of notice remains unclear.22
The third prong of Penn Central is consideration of the
"character of the governmental action," which I treat in detail
below. Of the three prongs, it is the least clear, as the discussion
below will show.22 Somehow, the courts are expected to blend or
balance these three prongs in deciding whether a Penn Central
taking has occurred.24 The Court has provided no guidance as to
how this is to be done. The term "balance" is itself inapt, for there
is no common scale on which the three factors can be measured. If
one conceives of the American judicial system as one in which
appellate courts give useful guidance to trial courts about the

20. See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 24
(1999) (finding a compensable taking, where about three-fourths of the land's
value was destroyed by the regulation); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl.
248 (2001), affd, Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (finding no compensable taking where about sixty percent of the land's
value was destroyed by the regulation).
21. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
22. See J. David Breemer & R. S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of
Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts'
Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L.
REV. 351, 355 (2005) (observing that landowners who are put on constructive
notice have no legitimate expectations to put their property to productive use);
Daniel Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB.
LAW. 215, 224-25 (1995) (noting Justice Scalia's recognition 'that this
limitation on the per se taking rule is consistent with taking jurisprudence").
23. See infra notes 27-39.
24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent
Domain Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 351, 355 ("The looseness of the relevant
factors invites, if not requires, the Court to engage in a general balancing test
that in turn places no limit on the factors to be considered or the outcome to be
reached.").
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meaning and application of the law, Penn Central represents an
appalling case of judicial malpractice. Justice O'Connor's
description of Penn Central as "vexing" hardly begins to express its
unsatisfactory nature; it is well nigh useless. Its grade would be a
D- at best, or perhaps simply an F.
II.

THE IMPACT OF LINGLE ON PENN CENTRAL

My purpose here is to show how Lingle affects the third prong
of the Penn Central analysis, "the character of the governmental
action." I will refer to this, in the interest of simplicity, as the
"character" element of the Penn Central test. Since the Supreme
Court has never explained exactly what the "character" phrase
means, lower courts and commentators have been forced to
grapple with its definition.
The most obvious meaning can be drawn from the context of
the phrase's use in Penn Central. In the next sentence in the
opinion, the Court noted that "a 'taking' may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government... when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good."25 Of course, by virtue
of the Court's later decision in Loretto, this has become a truism; a
permanent physical invasion is a per se taking. Hence, if this is all
that the "character" phrase meant,26 it was fully supplanted by
Loretto and thereafter had no independent meaning at all.
However, it seems more plausible to read the sentence quoted
above about physical invasions and adjustments to the benefits
and burdens of economic life as simply providing one illustration of
what the "character" test means, rather than as exhausting its
meaning. Indeed, both courts and commentators have usually
considered the test to have some further significance, although
they have had difficulty deciding what that significance is exactly.
The first view of the "character" test is that it is a measure of
the importance to the public of the regulation in question, and that
the more important the regulation, the less likely the government
will have to pay to implement it. In Keystone Bituminous Coal
7
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,"
finding no compensable taking in a
Pennsylvania statute requiring coal miners to maintain some coal
in place in order support the surface, the Court seemed to have in

25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
26. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122,
134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (understanding this to be the meaning of the
"character" test).
27. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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mind the "character" test when it observed that Pennsylvania was
attempting to "arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to
the common welfare." 8

Justice Stevens' dissent in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 9 made this point even
more strongly. The majority in First English held that a
compensable temporary taking might have occurred when Los
Angeles County prohibited all building on the church's land.
Stevens disagreed, in part because the prohibition was intended to
prevent use of a flood-prone canyon, and thus to protect public
safety. Stevens wrote:
Thus, in order to protect the health and safety of the community,
government may condemn unsafe structures, may close unlawful
business operations, may destroy infected trees, and surely may
restrict access to hazardous areas - for example, land on which
radioactive materials have been discharged, land in the path of a
lava flow from an erupting volcano, or land in the path of a
potentially life-threatening flood. When a governmental entity
imposes these types of health and safety regulations, it may not be
"burdened with the condition that [it] must compensate such
individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason
of their not being permitted, by a 3noxious use of their property, to
inflict injury upon the community."
Thus, Justice Stevens' opinion in First English, which was
joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, seems to give a "pass"
to the government, exempting it from compensation if the public
interest served by the regulation is strong and important enough.
It is plausible to read Stevens' view as responding to the Penn
Central "character" test and as treating protection of important
public interests like health and safety as giving the "character"
prong enough weight to overshadow the "magnitude" and
"investment-backed expectations" prongs, so that compensation
would not be required.
A second alternative view of the "character" test is as a
measure of whether the government is acting in bad faith playing "dirty tricks" on the landowner. For example, in Cooley v.
United States,31 the court considered a takings claim based on the

28. Id. at 485.
29. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
30. Id. at 325-26 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
31. 324 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the denial of a permit
to fill wetland by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers might constitute a regulatory
taking and remanding for further findings of fact under Lucas and Penn
Central).
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Army Corps of Engineers' denial of a wetlands fill permit under
the Clean Water Act. In discussing the issues on remand, the court
concluded that the Corps was "jerking around" the landowner
unjustifiably:
Accordingly, those agencies receive appropriate deference in
acquiring technical information. However, in the instant case the
agency admits its requests for additional information were not
necessary for issuing a permit. The trial court previously discounted
the credibility of the Corps' argument that the permit denial letter
requested additional information in an altruistic effort to issue a
permit. In conducting a Penn Central analysis, the trial court may
weigh whether the Corps' conduct evinces elements of bad faith. A
combination of extraordinary delay and intimated bad faith, under
the third prong of the Penn Central analysis, influence the character
of the governmental action. 32
One might have expected the court to relate this sort of
governmental conduct to the due process clause," but the reference
to Penn Central quite clearly indicates that the court was engaging
in a takings analysis.
34
Similarly, in American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States,
the Court of Claims concluded that the "character of the
government action" would be weighed negatively if that action
seemed to be aimed unfairly at one person, and especially if the
regulation was also retroactive, thus implicating the "investmentbacked expectations" prong of Penn Central:
[I]n considering the character of a governmental action alleged to
constitute a taking, at least two other factors are also relevant: (1)
whether the action is retroactive in effect, and if so, the degree of
retroactivity; and (2) whether the action is targeted at a particular
individual. Both factors are present here.35
A third approach is simply to build the Agins test into the
"character" prong of Penn Central, so that a failure of due process,
or particularly the "enhanced due process" test of Agins, makes the
"character" of the government's action bad, and hence tends to
lead to the conclusion that a taking has occurred. The Ninth
Circuit seems to have done this in Dodd v. Hood River County.36

32. Id. (internal citation omitted).
33. Of course, unfair treatment of a landowner may also be a due process or
an equal protection violation. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd. 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (mistreatment of landowner resulted in a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
563 (2000) (government's singling out landowner for mistreatment violated
Equal Protection Clause).
34. 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (2001).
35. Id. at 50 (internal citation omitted).
36. 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding no compensable taking
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Likewise, the Fourth Circuit thought that the length of the
amortization period for a nonconforming use, if unreasonably
short, might violate the principle of Agins and therefore trigger the
"character of the governmental action" factor in Georgia Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville.37 The decision of the Court
of Claims in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States'
furnishes another example, where the court summed up its
"character" analysis by concluding that "[tihere is no dispute
between the parties as to whether preservation of the wetlands
through the Corps' implementation of the Clean Water Act serves
to advance legitimate state interests. 39
There is no way to be sure which (if any) of these
understandings of the "character" test of Penn Central is "correct"
in any absolute sense, given the fact that the Supreme Court has
essentially left the "character" test unexplained. But all three of
these approaches have a common thread: all of them depend on
the government's reasons or motivations for taking the regulatory
action in question.
Because of that fact, none of these views is legitimate today if
one takes Justice O'Connor's position in Lingle seriously. None of
the views focus on the regulation's impact on the owner, which is
precisely the only focus that a proper takings analysis can have,
according to Lingle. As O'Connor asserted in Lingle, each of the
legitimate takings tests "focuses directly upon the severity of the
burden that government imposes upon private property rights" not on the government's reasons or motivations for taking
regulatory action. While an inquiry into the reasons or motivations
of the government may provide a useful background for
determining whether substantive due process has been violated, it
tells nothing useful about whether a taking has occurred. As
O'Connor observed: "[Ihf a government action is found to be
impermissible - for instance because it fails to meet the "public
use" requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can
authorize such action."'
Indeed, Justice O'Connor herself seems to have recognized
occurred when county refused to permit owners to construct a residence of
land zoned for forest use).
37. 900 F.2d 783, 787 (4th Cir. 1990). The prohibition on all off-premises
outdoor advertising signs within city did not necessarily constitute a
compensable taking. Id. at 784.
38. See Fla. Rock Indus., 45 Fed. Cl. at 76 (holding that a regulation
prohibiting filling and construction on wetlands constituted a partial
regulatory taking).
39. Id. at 66.
40. 544 U.S. at 539.
41. Id. at 543.
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that her Lingle opinion would destroy the third prong of Penn
Central when she wrote: "[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in
large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a
regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes
with legitimate property interests."42 The quoted language omits
any reference to the third prong of Penn Central, the "character"
test, and it inserts the "weasily" italicized language precisely
because, I suspect, O'Connor realized that the unmentioned
"character" prong was inconsistent with the Lingle opinion and
could not survive it.
What is left of Penn Central? It is now, as perhaps it should
always have been, purely an inquiry into the extent of the
government's intrusion into private ownership and private value.
There is no "balancing" left to do, and there are no contravening
factors that must be weighed against the intrusiveness of the
regulation. Penn Central is still ambiguous, but it is simpler and
less ambiguous than before. No longer will an extremely worthy, or
an extremely unworthy, governmental objective be relevant in
deciding whether a taking has occurred. An unworthy objective
will still be relevant in deciding whether the regulation violates
due process, and hence must be blocked by the court, but that is
all.
This is, I think, a salutary development. Property rights
advocates, obviously disappointed that they have been deprived of
the Agins "substantive due process taking" theory, will probably
applaud the disappearance of the "character of the governmental
action" prong of Penn Central on the ground that it will make
takings easier to establish. I am not certain that this is correct.
Perhaps the courts will compensate by ratcheting up the "economic
impact" prong of Penn Central, although no one is sure where that
line lies today.' But the "economic impact" prong is at least a
coherent, understandable measure, and that is for the better.
III. PROTECTING HEALTH AND SAFETY
AS A "BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE"

Justice O'Connor's rhetoric in Lingle, however, proves far too
much. She seems to assert that the government's objectives and
purposes in regulating land have now become irrelevant to a
takings analysis:

42. Id. at 540.
43. See Steven J. Eagle & William H. Mellor III, Regulatory Takings After
the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return to Property Rights, 29
CAL. W. L. REv. 209, 235 (1993) (predicting the same sort of development, but
by way of relaxation of the "no remaining economic value" standard of Lucas
rather than a tightening of the "economic impact" standard of Penn Central).
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The "substantially advances" formula suggests a means-ends test: It
asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective
in achieving some legitimate public purpose ....
But such a test is
not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been
"taken" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.4
But in reality, governmental objectives and purposes remain
highly relevant to takings analysis. The inescapable reason is that
the "background principles of nuisance and property law" referred
to by Justice Scalia in his opinion in Lucas4, continue to provide a
defense to a takings claim, and those principles are often directly
connected to governmental objectives and purposes. Under the
"background principles" concept, since no one has the right, under
property law, to engage in a nuisance, no one has a right to
compensation when the government regulates or prohibits the
nuisance, even if the result of doing so is to deprive the land of all
of its economic value.' It seems clear that, conceptually, the
"background principles" defense applies no matter what theory of
takings is at issue, Loretto, Lucas, or Penn Central, for no taking of
any sort can occur when a landowner is prohibited by regulation
from using land in a manner in which she or he could not have
legally used it in any event. The "background principles" exception
applies to all types of takings.47
Nor is nuisance the only example of a "background principle."
As the Lucas majority opinion explains:
[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled to
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a
landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others'
land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it
is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault. Such regulatory

44. 544 U.S. at 542.
45. 505 U.S. at 1030.
46. See, e.g., Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001)
(closing of motel that was being operated as a drug house and brothel was
justified on the ground that it was a public nuisance). Cf State ex rel. R.T.G.,
Inc. v. State, 753 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (prohibiting coal mining
was a compensable taking, where mining activity was not a nuisance).
47. See, e.g., Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 75-76 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2006) (quoting with approval Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005)). The court in Mutschler stated:
"Lucas's threshold inquiry applies not only to Lucas-style complete economic
wipeout takings, but also to physical occupation cases and, more importantly,
to Penn Central-type regulatory cases where less than total economic
deprivation has occurred." Id.; see also Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of
Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (implicitly finding that satisfaction of the
"background principles" doctrine would bar the finding of a taking under both
Lucas and Penn Central).
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action may well have the effect of eliminating the land's only
economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive
use that was previously permissible under relevant property and
nuisance principles.48
These illustrations of "background principles of nuisance and
property law" provided by Justice Scalia in Lucas are quite telling.
First, they establish the fairly obvious principle that literal
application of nuisance law is not the only "background principle."
Landfilling that results in flooding of a neighbor's land would
probably be a trespass rather than a nuisance, 9 but either way, it
would be illegal and enjoinable, and hence not included in the
landowner's property rights. One can think of other "background
principles" as well, such as the public's right to use beaches under
the doctrine of "custom" recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court
in State ex rel Thornton v. Hay," or the hunting and fishing rights
of native Hawaiians on vacant land recognized by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in the PASH case."1 Michael C. Blumm and Lucus
Ritchie52 have catalogued several other categories of "background
principles" identified by state and lower federal courts, including
preexisting water rights," the federal servitude on navigable
waterways,' the "natural use" doctrine,' the duty to maintain
48. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30.
49. See Lyons v. Twp. of Wayne, 888 A.2d 426, 433 (N.J. 2005)
("Individually, an instance of flooding is a trespass, but it is also a nuisance if
it is repeated or of long duration." (internal citation omitted)).
50. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969) (finding that "custom" comprehended a right of
the public to make use of the dry sand portion of all beaches in the state);
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. 1992) (determining that
the right of "custom" recognized in Thornton is a Lucas "background
principle").
51. See Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. County of Hawaii, 903 P.2d 1246
(Haw. 1995).
52. See supra note 47.
53. See. e.g., West Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Res., 26
P.3d 1171 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
54. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (holding that the federal navigation servitude is a "background
principle" under Lucas). Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas concedes that the
government's navigation servitude may be a "background principle" when he
cites Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900), which recognizes such a
servitude. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
55. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972)
(limiting undeveloped or agrarian land to its "natural" uses); Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1059 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same). Contra McQueen v. S. C. Coastal
Council, 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the "natural use"
doctrine is not a "background principle" of state law); K & K Const., Inc. v.
Dep't of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd on
other grounds, 575 N.W.2d 531 (1998) ("[A] request to fill in wetlands does not
constitute a nuisance that the government may abate"). See also Good v.
United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 98 n.30 (1997), affd, 189 F.3d 1355 (1999)
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7
lateral support of a public highway,' the public trust doctrine,
and the "wildlife trust" doctrine." A regulation enforcing such
principles could not be a taking under Justice Scalia's analysis
because the regulation would only be restating historical
limitations on the landowner's rights.
But these background principles can easily be stated as
representing government programs designed to enhance the public
good, and thus to accomplish "legitimate public purposes." For
example, the doctrine of "custom" recognized by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Hay is simply the recognition of the public
benefits of providing the state's citizens with broad access to the
state's beaches.59 The right of native Hawaiians to make customary
uses of vacant land is the recognition of the traditional values of
those individuals and the desirability of respecting and protecting
those values. Indeed, the law of nuisance can be described either

(noting that the status of "natural use" as a background principle of state law
is unclear).
56. Kim v. City of N.Y., 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
57. The public trust doctrine provides that the state holds public trust
lands, waters, and resources for the benefit of its citizens, with an inherent
right of the public to enjoy them even if they are privately owned. See
Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *6-8 (R.I. Super.
Ct., July 5, 2005) (prohibition of owner's development of coastal land was
warranted by public trust doctrine as well as nuisance law); McQueen v. S. C.
Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (prohibition of development was
justified by public trust doctrine); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle,
307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the public trust doctrine was a
"background principle" that would preclude finding a taking when the City of
Seattle, acting under the Washington's Shoreline Management Act ("SMA"),
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.010, prohibited the owner from developing the
shoreline with housing). The Esplanade holding was foreshadowed in Hope M.
Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings
Jurisprudence?:The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
58. A branch of the public trust doctrine that holds that government
ownership of wildlife should be exercised as a trust for the benefit of the
public. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338,
347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that "wildlife regulation of some sort has
been historically a part of the preexisting law of property" and is thus a Lucas
background principle); Geer v. Conn., 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) ("[Tlhe power
or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common ownership, is to be
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the
people"); Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A
Reinterpretationof Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605,
608-09 (2004) (discussing the wildlife trust doctrine).
59. The court's action can, of course, be criticized as a retroactive
"recognition" of a public right that had never before been noticed by the
judiciary. See, e.g., David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and
Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public
Trust "Exceptions" and the (Mis)Use of Investment-backed Expectations, 36
VAL. U. L. REV. 339 (2002). But that is not my point here.
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as designed to prevent one landowner from harming the rights of
others, or as securing the public benefits of quiet, of freedom from
offensive odors, and the like. One could go on, but the point is
obvious: the existence of a legitimate public purpose is inherent in
the "background principles" concept. Hence, public purpose is
anything but irrelevant to a takings analysis.
The intriguing question, however, is how far the notion of
"background principles" can be extended. To push the concept a
bit, let us consider another type of regulation: a parcel of land has
become dangerous (or has come to be recognized as dangerous) for
human use. Lutherglen, the land owned by the Lutheran Church
in FirstEnglish, provides an apt illustration. Los Angeles County's
only objection to rebuilding on Lutherglen was that it was located
in a canyon subject to flash flooding. The county had designated
the canyon as within a flood protection area, and had prohibited
construction of all buildings and structures. In essence, the land
had been severely restricted by regulation in order to forestall the
risks to personal safety that would be raised through its use.60
Now assume that the regulatory restriction on Lutherglen is
sufficiently severe and permanent to constitute a Lucas or Penn
Central taking.61 Can the "background principles" concept be
employed as a defense to a takings claim? What background
principle would be applicable? The law of nuisance pretty clearly
does not apply, for if the Lutheran Church rebuilt the structure on
Lutherglen, doing so would have no adverse effect on nearby land.
The concept of nuisance, of necessity, assumes that use of the land
generates negative externalities affecting other land. 2
60. Note that the regulatory remedy did not precisely fit the risk, for the
county ordinance prohibited only construction of buildings and structures, and
not low-intensity uses such as tent camping (which might indeed have been
quite dangerous). Nonetheless, prohibiting structures could quite rationally be
expected to reduce or minimize, if not to completely eliminate, human use of

the land.
61. The California Court of Appeal, on remand in First English, held that
no taking had occurred, both because the land had some residual value despite
the inability of the church to build on it, and because of the serious threat to

safety that would be raised by building on the land. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 905-07 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989). The decision must be understood in the light of a long record of
hostility to regulatory takings claims in the California courts. For example, in
1979 the California Supreme Court held in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 157
Cal.Rptr. 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), that there was no such thing as a
regulatory taking, and that the landowner's only remedy for an unduly
burdensome regulation was to have the court treat it as a due process
violation and suspend its operation.
62. See Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 669 P.2d 643 (Idaho Ct. App.
1983); David S. Wilgus, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental
Ethics and Landowner Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 99, 125 (2001).
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One possible alternative "background principle" argument in
the Lutherglen case harks back to Mugler v. Kansas,3 in which a
brewery owner asserted that a state liquor prohibition law
constituted a taking of his property rights without compensation
because it denied him use of his property. In sweeping language,
the 1887 Supreme Court denied the claim, holding the regulation a
valid exercise of the police power:
It cannot be supposed that the States intended, by adopting... [the
Fourteenth] Amendment, to impose restraints upon the exercise of
their powers for the protection of the safety, health, or morals of the
community .... [Alll property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community.

A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or
use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by
any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
interests.A
One can almost hear, in the quotation above, echoes of Justice
Scalia's "background principles" language in Lucas. Taken
literally, Mugler would seem to teach that if each landowner has a
preexisting obligation not to use his or her property in a manner
"injurious to the community," than a regulation that prevents such
use cannot be a taking, no matter how severe its economic impact.
Indeed, this is virtually the position taken by the California Court
of Appeal on remand in First English.65 After quoting from Mugler,
the court noted: "We recognize a brewery is a far cry from a Bible
camp. But here the threat to public health and safety emanates
not from what is produced on the property but from the presence of
any substantial structures on that property."6' Hence, according to
the court's logic, prohibiting the rebuilding of the structures could
not be a taking. Justice Stevens' dissent from the Supreme Court's
majority opinion in First English67 expresses the same view: if the
regulation protects health or safety (or perhaps other important
63. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
64. Id. at 664-65, 668-69.
65. See FirstEnglish, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 898.

66. Id. at 899.
67. See supra note 30.
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public values), every property owner is legally bound to comply
with it, and hence it cannot constitute a taking.
Can this view be taken seriously? Surely not. Its reference to
Mugler reaches back 120 years, to a time when the distinctions
between the takings and due process clauses had not been worked
out. Such a view would turn Lingle on its head, teaching not only
that a due process violation cannot per se be the basis for finding a
taking, but also that a regulation satisfying the due process clause
cannot possibly be a taking. This is manifestly unacceptable to the
modern Supreme Court. It would disregard Lucas itself, in which
there was a legislative finding of, and presumably the actual
presence of, abundant benefits to the public welfare - some
relating to health or safety - from prohibiting the building of
houses on the South Carolina beach.' It would completely
undercut Justice O'Connor's argument that the government's
purposes and objectives should be irrelevant to the finding of a
taking. In essence, it would completely gut the concept of
regulatory takings. Ultimately, then, Mugler, and such progeny as
the California Court of Appeal's opinion in FirstEnglish, must be
understood to hold that a finding that the government has acted to
advance a valid police power objective will insulate the
government against a due process attack, but not necessarily
against attack based on the takings clause.
IV. A MORE LIMITED "BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE":
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
It is nonetheless almost certain that some narrower version of
the "health and safety regulation as a background principle"
argument can succeed. While I lack the temerity to guess what
possible forms it might take, I will offer one illustration, provided
by Justice Scalia himself in a footnote in his Lucas opinion." A city
has caught fire, and the fire is spreading. The city's officers
conclude that the best (or only) way to stop the fire's spread is to
destroy a building or a row of buildings, thus creating a firebreak.7
This example differs from the example of First English discussed
above because there is nothing dangerous or unsafe - at least at
the time of demolition - about the building itself, and even if

68. The South Carolina legislature had found that a stable, uneroded beach
benefited the public by acting as a barrier to storms, promoting tourism,
providing a habitat for various plants and animals, and providing a desirable
environment for human use. Construction on the beach was found to threaten
and impair these benefits. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022.
69. Id. at 1029 n.16.
70. Id. See Inhabitants of Frankfort v. Waldo County Comm'rs, 40 Me. 389
(1855), in which the government paid compensation to the building owner on
similar facts.
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there were, the danger could be eliminated simply by prohibiting
occupancy until the fire risk had passed. The building is
demolished to protect other properties; it is simply in the wrong
place at the wrong time. Moreover, the building cannot credibly be
called a nuisance, 7' nor does it fit any of the other categories of
"background principles" thus far identified by the courts.2 It seems
quite arguable that this sort of public action can qualify facially as
a Loretto taking a permanent physical occupation. The
government's demolition team physically enters on the real estate
and the consequences, at least, are permanent: the building is
removed. 73 Nonetheless, there is ample authority for the
proposition that no compensation need be paid. In Bowditch v.
Boston, 4 the 1879 Supreme Court rejected a landowner's claim to
compensation on these facts and asserted that such was the
historic rule: "At the common law every one had the right to
destroy real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to
prevent the spreading of a fire, and there was no responsibility on
the part of such destroyer, and no remedy for the owner."" This
principle, sometimes denominated "necessity", continues to be
applied,"6 and it was recognized by Justice Scalia in his opinion in
Lucas as a proper illustration of a "background principle" that
would eliminate the necessity of the government's paying
compensation.77
There is, however, some disingenuousness at work here.
"Necessity" is always a matter of degree, and the degree required
might be a matter on which opinions differ.7 ' There may be a
71. The Eastern District of Michigan made precisely this point in
discussing Bowditch in Flatford v. City of Monroe, 794 F. Supp. 227, 233 (E.D.
Mich. 1992).
72. See cases cited supra notes 50-58.
73. But see Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1995),
disagreeing with this view. Portland had demolished a partially renovated but
abandoned, boarded-up building - a clear case of nuisance - but the court
commented that "this does not amount to a physical occupation even where
the government's activity has a permanent effect." Id. at 787.
74. 101 U.S. 16 (1879).
75. Id. at 18.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1953) (no compensation
was granted to owners of oil terminal facilities in the Philippines that were
demolished by the United States Army to prevent their falling into Japanese
hands at the commencement of World War II); Strickland v. Dep't of Agric. &
Consumer Servs., 922 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (no compensation
available to landowner whose property was damaged by firefighters); McCoy v.
Sanders, 148 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (no compensation was available
to landowner whose pond was drained by police seeking body of murder
victim). See also Inhabitants of Frankfort, 40 Me. 389, in which the
government paid compensation to the building owner on similar facts.
77. 505 U.S. at 1029.
78. See, for example, Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980),
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difference between the importance to the public of stopping the fire
in Bowditch and stopping erosion of the beach in Lucas, but it is
not a conceptually fundamental difference. The flood-protection
ordinance in First English would seem to be somewhere in
between, but presumably on the compensable side of the line..7 The
present (and likely future) state of the law of regulatory takings
leaves the courts to search for that elusive and ill-defined
boundary between regulations that address "necessity" and hence
leave the government free of the duty to compensate, and those
that address issues of public importance somewhere short of
"necessity" and thus require compensation if they go too far.
Perhaps this is not so bad. It is, after all, the sort of thing
judges are paid to decide. Greater predictability would be
desirable, but at least it is easy enough to discern the nature of the
scale on which these cases are arrayed, even if we cannot be sure
exactly where the line between "necessity" and ordinary police
power regulations is to be placed.
V. CONCLUSION

What has Lingle accomplished for the future of takings law,
aside from its obvious effect of eliminating the "due process
taking" theory? First, I have suggested that it has eliminated from
any further consideration the speculative meanings of the
"character of the governmental action" element of the Penn
Central test that have been proposed by the lower courts."0 This
simplifies and rationalizes Penn Central in a desirable way.
Second, I have argued that, despite Justice O'Connor's rhetorical
efforts, Lingle did not eliminate, and could not possibly have
eliminated, the relevance of the government's aims, objectives, and
purposes in assessing whether a Fifth Amendment taking has
in which the police burned down a house in which escaped convicts were
hiding in order to capture them. The court ordered compensation, based
primarily on the Texas Constitution, which provides that property may not be
"taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use, without adequate
compensation." TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. I, § 17. The court recognized the
doctrine of necessity, but concluded that it should not apply. The court quoted
Prosser on Torts to emphasize that the degree of necessity is the critical fact:
Thus one who dynamites a house to stop the spread of a conflagration
that threatens a town, or shoots a mad dog in the street, or burns
clothing infected with smallpox germs, or, in time of war, destroys
property which should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the
enemy, is not liable to the owner, so long as the emergency is great
enough, and he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 (citing PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (4th ed.
1971)) (emphasis added).
79. The California Court of Appeals to the contrary notwithstanding. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
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occurred. The reason is that those aims, objectives, and purposes
are intimately bound up in the "background principles" concept of
Lucas, and by their nature cannot be separated.
Indeed, the remaining meaning of "character of the
governmental action" is nothing more or less than the
incorporation into Penn Central of the Lucas "background
principles" concept. 81 To that extent but no further, "character of
the governmental action" is a test that remains alive and well. The
practical difficulty, of course, is that the scope of the "background
principles" is often unclear or debatable. Thus we are left to
conclude that some regulations of land conform to "background
principles" and others do not, and that the distinction between the
two types of regulations is likely to remain indistinct and
debatable long into the future.

81. Judge Allegra of the U.S. Court of Claims recognized this fact in his
opinion in Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (2001), affd, Walcek v.
United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2002), when he wrote, as part of his
analysis of the "character of the governmental action" prong of the Penn
Centraltest:
There is no significant evidence in this case that the plaintiffs' proposed
use of the Property would formally constitute a nuisance under
Delaware state law, so that the application of the Federal wetland
regulations could be viewed as enforcing a limitation already inherent in
the Property. At the same time, the existence of the wetland regulations
in question, as well as their application to the Property, indisputably
serve an important public purpose - one which benefits plaintiffs as
members of the public at large.
49 Fed. Cl. at 270 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

